On Iran, Egypt, Arab Revolutions, and Military Power……….

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Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi told the media that restoring relations between his country and Egypt has been going slow because Iran “understands” the immense pressures being put on Egypt. He said Egyptians seem to need more time because of those external pressures. Relations were expected to resume quickly but seem to have been delayed after an intense campaign both private and public by Saudi (and UAE) authorities on Egypt. It is possible that the U.S administration also has had a hand through its close ties with Egypt’s ruling military junta. Egypt has been trying to walk a fine line between a desire to resume relations with Tehran and a natural inclination of its military rulers to maintain close ties with the Saudis. Saudi Arabia announced a US$ 4 billion aid package for Egypt a few weeks ago, and the country aspires to attract much investment from the Gulf GCC states.
Clearly Egyptian authorities are worried about the economy as tourism took a hit during the early stages of the revolution. The revolution itself may not be over in Egypt, depending on how much power the military junta decides to keep. It is wise for the young and others who flocked to Tahrir Square to remain alert: a revolution needs its owners to speak up and assert control of it, otherwise others, like the fundamentalist Islamists or the military or a combination of the two, will take over. In the case of Iran (1979) the mullahs were clever enough to liquidate the Shah’s military officer corps before turning their attention to their political rivals. They paid a price for liquidating the Shah’s military during the first year of the Iraqi invasion.
In the Middle East, especially in Arab states, the military has traditionally been aggressive in usurping political power during pre-revolutionary times. Even the bloodthirsty Ba’athists came to power on top of tanks in both Iraq (1963, 1968) and Syria (1963). Even though the Communist Party of Iraq traditionally had much more support, the Ba’ath managed to take power because it had so many Ba’athists from Takrit and points west in the military. Actually, the Shi’a Hawza in Iraq inadvertently helped the Ba’ath gain power through attacks on the communists whom it saw as the real threat in Iraq. As it turned out, the real threat were the Ba’athists who clung to power for 35 years, provoked two major wars, and were dislodged by American (and British) forces in 2003.
Cheers
mhg




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