Revisiting the Shi’a Question: a Right-Wing Media Campaign in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf ……..

Today, Alarabiya network headlines an interview with a Saudi writer al-Hatlan, who proclaims that Saudi Shi’as had problems with the Salafi religious establishment only and that they had no problems with the political leadership. This is news to me and to Saudi Shi’as who cannot name a single high-level or middle-level official appointed from among them, and who often have to go through an ‘inquisition’ committee to get into a college in the kingdom. With about 15% of the population, the same ratio as the Sunni Arabs of Iraq, they cannot, never could, point to a minister, a deputy minister, or even an assistant deputy minister from among them. Unlike Iraq, there are no elections in the kingdom where they can campaign and do political bargaining.
The claim is that Safawi Shi’ism, meaning old Iranian-style, is receding and that an Arab version of Shi’ism is taking hold among the country’s Shi’a minority. There is no such thing as Safawi Shi’ism anymore: that was a term when the Safawi dynasty ruled in Iran and fought with the Ottoman Turks over the provinces that now form Iraq. The term was revived by Saddam Hussein when he invaded Iran, and it has been picked up by right-wing media in the Persian Gulf states in recent years. Its undeclared aim is rather insidious: to paint Iraqi Shi’as with the brush of ‘foreign influence’ and delegitimize any government they form (even while these same sponsoring regimes themselves are under foreign Western influence). In the process all Shi’as in these Gulf states have been painted with the same brush by pro-Saudi right-wing media.
Even the idea of Wilayat al-Faqi (Rule of a Supreme Clergy) is not Safawi as some right-wing Arab writers seem to imply. The Safawis were a monarchy, a Persian empire ruled by kings, and this ‘clergy rule’ idea started with Ayatollah Khomeini and there were, there still are, senior Iranian clergy who do not agree with it. Ali al-Sistani of Najaf certainly does not agree with it. Nor did Hussein Fadlallah of Lebanon.
Most Arab Shi’as, especially in Iraq, do not support the Iranian-style Wilayat al-Faqi (Rule of a Supreme Clergy), but that is not new; they never have. Whenever Arab Shi’as looked toward Iran after 1979, it was merely a result of disenfranchisement and serious discrimination, as was and still is the case in Saudi Arabia. Even the Hezbollah (and Amal) phenomenon in Lebanon was a direct result of generations of discrimination against Lebanese Shi’as who now most likely form a plurality of all Lebanese. Without repression by the traditional Lebanese feudal warlord system, and by elements of the Fatah military groups during the 1970, then by the Israeli military occupation after 1982, there would be no Hezbollah. The Iranians provided the training and the funds that enabled Hezbollah to expand rapidly after 1983 and to dominate Shi’a politics and Lebanese politics. Still, I imagine most Lebanese Shi’as, even though they support Hezbollah, do not agree with Mr. Nasrallah’s adoption of the Rule of Supreme Clergy. Most Arab Shi’as do not, and many Iranian Shi’as do not as well. In the case of Iran it is not clear how many, because the Supreme Cleric leader is not elected.
Interesting, but all this is probably part of an ongoing campaign to de-couple the Shia’s of Arab countries from the Iranian model. I have a simple suggestion that would ensure a complete decoupling of Arab Shi’as from Iran in all political matters: stop state-sponsored discrimination against them in places like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (where they are a majority), and they will have no reason to look outside their own countries for help and support. Many of them will probably even support the absolute tribal oligarchy.
(Shi’ism, of course, started in Hijaz in what is now Saudi Arabia, in the seventh century and spread to Iraq where it took roots long before it reached Iran).
Cheers
mhg
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