The Two Cold Wars of the Persian Gulf. Of Hegemony, Currency Union, and Claustrophobia
The first one, the more known one, the public one, involves a partial Arab cold war with Iran, and it is led and instigated by the Saudis. Its premise is that the theocrats in Tehran have made serious inroads into the Arab world, and that should be stopped and reversed. The Iranians have in fact made inroads into Arab states, from Iraq to Gaza, and it is natural that it worries some Arab powers. This cold war openly uses media tools and one of its important weapons is spreading the fear that Iran aims to spread its own brand of Islam, Shi’ism, in other Arab states. Three Arab countries have Shi’a majorities or pluralities: Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon. The media war saws fear that soon other states will have more Shi’as than they should have. It is also possible that the Saudi campaign uses proxies, sometimes armed proxies, just as Iran uses Hezbullah.
The Egyptian government is going along with this campaign, perhaps to satisfy their Saudi allies and benefactors. Libya’s Qaddafi is definitely not buying it; he does not make a good sidekick, unlike Egypt’s Mubarak. Nor are many others besides the king of Jordan.
Not all Arab states, even on the Persian Gulf, are buying the Saudi argument, even as they are apprehensive about Iranian power. Qatar especially has a strong independent streak, as does Oman and to some extent the UAE. Both the last two have strong trade, cultural, and historical ties to Iran of the kind that the historically isolated Saudis have never had.
This sets the stage for the second Gulf cold war: the cold war among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Like all family conflicts, it is complex because it involves conflicting emotions and undercurrents. In this war, the huge Saudi media, and a few of its satellites in other Gulf states, Lebanon, and Egypt, have followed a two pronged approach. On the one hand they have concentrated the media political assault on Qatar, a close friend of Iran and Iraq, but also an American ally where the regional US Central Command is housed. The political media war has also been aimed heavily at Iraq, but that is not new.
On the other hand, they have recently upped the ante against the UAE, which along with Oman has refused to join the proposed GCC Gulf currency union. The currency union has little economic advantage, as I noted in previous postings here, and almost certainly would mean Saudi hegemony on economic, and eventually political, affairs of the smaller Persian Gulf states. Many people in the Gulf see the Saudi political system as claustrophobic, as do some Saudis. Actually it is more than that: there is no such thing as a Saudi political system- all politicking is done only within the ruling family.
Qatar uses its very popular al-Jazeera satellite network, the United Arab Emirates have been using their media web site Middle East Online to tweak the Saudi nose. The Saudis have at their disposal the vastest chain of media outlets in the Middle East, possibly in the world outside the USA. This network covers newspapers, television networks, and web sites all over the world, including such outlets as Asharq Alawsat, al-Hayat, and Alarabiya. They also have the best Lebanese journalists that money can buy, which literally means most of the best Lebanese journalists around. At some point the wife of the Emir of Qatar, Shaikha Mauza, was targeted for direct vicious attacks in Saudi (Asharq Alawsat) and Egyptian (al-Gomhouriya) media. The former is owned by a royal prince, the latter is government-owned.
This inter-Gulf feud has gotten serious enough that both the Sultan of Oman and President of the UAE boycotted the last GCC summit in Riyadh. During that summit, the Saudis got heavy-handed and forced a decision to pick Riyadh as the site for a future regional central bank. I wrote earlier why Riyadh was a terrible choice for a central bank site as well as a potential regional financial center. As for the UAE, Middle East Online does not miss an opportunity to mention the alleged fabrication of evidence on the al-Khobar Tower bombings in 1996 and the various arms purchases kickback (bribe) scandals involving Saudi princes.
Oddly, the UAE and Oman are the only GCC states where the ruling families do not have the same tribal roots as the al-Saud of Najd. This can be a coincidence.
It will be interesting to see how things develop within the GCC, which historically has managed to sweep disagreements under the rug. Things are developing to an extent that some states now feel that their sovereignty is on the line, and they seem to be pulling back from the currency union. They also may be playing the Iranian card to balance the tightening Saudi embrace.
Cheers
mhg
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